

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO	Chief, EE		XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO	Chief of Base, Bonn Chief, MLB			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Operational/Liaison Meeting with UTILITY 29 September 1964.			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
<p>1. UTILITY called on me 29 September principally for the purpose of discussing Krone's position. My report on this subject and several others is attached (USC TNP).</p> <p>2. A few points not included in the report follow: UTILITY was at pains to point out to me that while foreign policy is certainly out of his field he is much closer to Krone than he is to Schroeder on the question of how to deal with France (I am really very pleased that the question of the French alliance came up at lunch with UTILITY present since as you know I have attempted to get UTILITY to report confidentially on Franco/German relations and on what he learns in Paris. The rumors referred to in the attached report are of course CATIDE reports. UTILITY himself relegated them to the rumor category.)</p> <p>3. I told UTILITY that there is no doubt but that the U.S. does want to keep France lined up within the framework of the Atlantic alliance and that any influence that the Germans could bring to this end would be welcome.</p> <p>4. UTILITY believes that there may be a desire on the part of the USSR to defer the Erhard/Khrushchev meeting until after the Queen's visit to Germany. Since I took this to be gloomy speculation in the wake of the Schwirkmann affair, I have not reported it. Would appreciate having MLB check with @Degenhardt and Company. Do not quote UTILITY.</p> <p>5. UTILITY believes that a lecture that Gerstenmaier is planning to give in Paris -- apparently the same one he recently gave in Tokyo -- has found favor in high places in the French Government.</p> <p>Attachment: USC TNP Memo dated 30 Sept 64</p> <p>Distribution: ✓2 - Chief, EE w/att USC 2 - COB Bonn w/att USC 2 - C/MLB w/att USC</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		DATE	
	EGWA - 10		6 October 1964	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		HQS FILE NUMBER	

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 302E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGWA -- 10
<p>6. UTILITY again remarked that his relations with the British are very close. He said that he had pushed for a better understanding with London at the time of the Franco/German rapprochement. He felt this was one way of keeping things in balance. He considers that he now enjoys a relationship based on full mutual confidence.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[                      ]</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>BEST AVAILABLE COPY</b></p>		
FORM 10-57 <b>53a</b> (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-26, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.  CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED  PAGE NO. <b>2</b>

C O P Y

30 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador George C. McGhee

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Gehlen 29 September '64

1. General Gehlen, President of the BND, had the following comments to make 29 September. He felt that the briefing given by the Director of Central Intelligence on 28 September had been a thorough going success. After the briefing, Chancellor Erhard asked him whether German intelligence could produce good photography. He replied that in his opinion the cost of such a program would be well out of the range of anything the Germans could undertake. He added that in his opinion the Germans should concentrate on doing the very best job of collection that they can and that they should give full support to American intelligence and should cultivate very strong ties with the U.S.

2. Further to this point, Gehlen told me that he has recently written to Minister Westrick asking that the budgetary ceiling imposed on his organization two years ago be re-examined. He explained that in the late 50's and early 60's, with Adenauer's full agreement, he had embarked on a program of increasing Germany's collection capabilities in the signal intelligence field. He has now reached the point where he cannot round out his collection effort without more funds.

3. Gehlen did not indicate whether he thought he has a chance of getting more money but he did say that the present administration is now much better informed about intelligence than it was at the outset.

4. Gehlen felt that Minister Krone had not completely succeeded in answering the question: Can the German Government, using its close alliance with France, bring France somewhat more into step within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance? Gehlen said that Krone's replies had seemed to him to be somewhat hesitant and enigmatic, although clearly indicating that Krone feels deeply about the matter. As background, Gehlen explained that Krone has been one to urge Chancellor Erhard to keep the door open to France. His interest in keeping Franco/German relations on a good footing is in part inspired by fear that France, feeling rebuffed, may embark on an entirely independent course isolating herself from Germany and the U.S. and in a sense placing Germany in the awkward position of standing between unfriendly forces. Gehlen said that there had been rumors in Paris that such a course of action may be contemplated and that he and Krone, while not believing that such a decision has been made, are concerned that it might be.

BEST AVAILABLE

Gordon M. Stewart